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. Professor, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. This paper was presented
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years there has been a remarkable theoretical
flourishing in the field of environmental philosophy, with the
development of biocentric ethics, animal rights theories, deep ecology,
ecofeminism, modified utilitarianism, moral pluralism and theories
drawing on numerous religious and cultural traditions! These theories
explore the intellectual and moral causes for the environmentally
destructive practices of the dominant western industrial and economic
culture, and propose alternatives that might avoid these consequences.
This symposium raises a worthy question: to what extent have these
theories had practical impact on environmental law and policy. I come
to this question as a lawyer and not a philosopher. My interest in
environmental philosophy has grown out of the belief that
environmental law cannot and will not succeed unless there is strong
public commitment to conserving nonhuman nature. Therefore, I am
convinced that environmental law will not endure or have lasting effect
unless environmental philosophy does indeed come down to earth
successfully to affect how people view the world. Several of the
participants in this symposium have contributed over the years to the
2important work of trying to ensure that this happens. I will argue that
this work is vitally important for the future of environmental law as well
1 The literature in the field cannot be adequately summarized in a footnote. Some of
the early leading works articulating these various theories are: J. BAIRD CALLICOT7, IN
DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIc: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (1989); BILL DEVALL
& GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY: LIVING AS IF NATURE MATTERED (1985); DHARMA
GALA: A HARVEST OF ESSAYS IN BUDDHISM AND ECOLOGY (Allan Hunt Badiner ed., 1990);
BRYAN G. NORTON, TOWARD UNITY AMONG ENVIRONMENTALISTS (1991); JOHN PASSMORE,
MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS
(1974); TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983); REWEAVING THE WORLD: THE
EMERGENCE OF ECOFEMINISM (Irene Diamond & Gloria Feman Orenstein eds., 1990);
HOLMES ROLSTON II, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN THE NATURAL
WORLD (1988); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE,
EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987); Arne Naess, The Deep
Ecology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects, 8 PHIL. INQUIRY 10 (1986). See Clare Palmer,
An Overview of Environmental Ethics, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 15
(Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III eds., 2002). The quarterly International Society for
Environmental Ethics Newsletter contains a comprehensive ongoing bibliography. Several
journals, including Environmental Ethics, are major sites of ongoing academic dialogue
about environmental ethics.
2 See STONE, supra note 1; NORTON, supra note 1; DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM:
MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999); BRYAN G.
NORTON, SEARCHING FOR SUSTAINABILITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY; LAURA WESTRA, AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSAL FOR ETHICS
(1994).
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as for the success of environmental philosophy itself.
In Part I, I contend that the American public lacks a coherent account
of the values we pursue under our current environmental laws. In place
of analysis, the public tends simply to equate environmental law with
environmental values. The assumption that our laws are environmental
in the sense that they reflect environmental values is dangerous and
incorrect.3 This incoherent popular assumption about our environmental
laws both undermines efforts to reform environmental law and impedes
the ongoing development of environmental ethics among the public. In
response, I suggest some ways in which the conceptual work done by
philosophers can and should be deployed to advance public thinking
about environmental values and ethics, and ultimately, environmental
law. An important first step is to employ concepts drawn from
environmental philosophy to analyze our current laws and policies.
Part II suggests that philosophers and legal scholars can also help to
bring philosophy down to earth by developing "stepping stones" for
those who seek to modify the ethics embedded in our current laws and
policies. I use the term "stepping stones" to invoke concepts that
represent marginal or gradual change from the dominant human-
centered utilitarian ethical framework, as opposed to radically divergent
theories of environmental ethics, such as a biocentric intrinsic value
theory. I posit that work to develop enlightened variants of human-
centered utilitarian ethics may bridge the realms of philosophy and law.
Such concepts can transform the ethics of the American public. One
essential precondition, if environmental philosophy is to take root, is that
people understand why environmental ethics matter on the ground. The
creation of stepping stones will help people to see the significance and
relevance of ethical issues to environmental law and policy.
To illustrate, I explore how sustainability, while not a coherent
environmental ethic, shows promise as a stepping stone. I describe six
attributes of sustainability and explore how sustainability serves to
highlight key ethical issues and to provide a logical "next step" for those
dissatisfied with the ethics embedded in current law and policy.
Involvement by philosophers and legal scholars in shaping concepts like
sustainability can help ensure that these concepts do not become
' An important function of law is to codify widely shared values. "Like any other
system of laws, environmental legislation importantly articulates and enforces norms that
society holds in high value...." Sheila Jasanoff, Law, in A COMPANION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 344 (Dale Jamieson ed., 2001). The problem I highlight is the
misperception or lack of clarity about the values articulated and enforced in practice under
our laws.
University of California, Davis
meaningless slogans. Work at the intersection of environmental law and
philosophy may fill an important gap, ensuring that law and philosophy
both fulfill their promise.
I. UNEARTHING THE ETHICS EMBEDDED IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Where Are We Headed?
As the new millennium dawned, we found ourselves awash in
4environmental law. In the three decades since the first Earth Day, we
have moved from outrage over unacceptable environmental impacts of
otherwise legal activity to acceptance that a distinct body of law
addressing these impacts is necessary. This consensus and body of law
reflect apparent agreement to change the way we were doing business in
order to better account for impacts on the environment and human
health.
This overwhelming consensus calls to mind an image from one of my
favorite websites: www.despair.com. What this site sells is the
antithesis of the motivational posters one sees on the walls of some
businesses and gyms: glossy photos of mountain climbers scaling a peak
or of teams of people accomplishing some impressive feat. The
Demotivators TM, as they are called, show the usual photos, but have titles
like "Get to Work" (with the motto "You aren't being paid to believe in
the power of your dreams").' One of these posters captures well why I
believe that environmental philosophy has an important role to play in
the long-term success of environmental law. This Demotivator TM features
a crew team of four rowers in a quad, gliding across flat, gleaming water,
their backs to their destination, their oars in perfect unison. Instead of an
inspirational heading such as "Teamwork" or "Balance," the title is
"Ignorance." The motto beneath reads, "It's amazing how much easier it
is for a team to work together when no one has any idea where they're
going."
6
How does this relate to environmental philosophy and law? I start
with the premise that in many ways, our society has been working
effectively to support environmental protection. We have been rowing
' I use the term environmental law to describe the vast realm of law, largely statutory
in basis, that addresses human actions affecting the rest of the natural world. Thus it
includes both natural resources law and pollution control law.
' http://www.despair.com/gettowork.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
6 http://www.despair.com/ignorance.html (last visited Sept. 16,2003).
[Vol. 37:53
2003] Building an Environmental Ethic from the Ground Up 57
in unison, a majority consistently supporting environmental laws to•7
protect human health and the environment• And we now have an
amazing architecture of environmental law and policy, of state and
federal law, of agencies and programs. But like this crew team, I think
that underneath our successful veneer of broad unified support for
environmental laws and policies, few among us really know where we
are going.
B. How Have We Come So Far Without Knowing Where We Are Headed?
One reason for our ignorance about what values our laws advance is
the assumption that we all know what values environmental laws
protect and the justification for doing so. Environmental law was
developed in response to the public perception that human health and
the environment were inadequately protected. Because
environmentalism was and is so widely viewed as a good,8 we lack a
nuanced discourse about what it means. Most people assume that our
laws are "environmental" because they embody environmentalism or
some set of environmental values, not just because they deal with the
environment as a topic. Too often we assume that environmental law is
a pure reflection of "environmental" values as opposed to other human
values. This assumption is only partly correct. It is true that these laws
likely incorporate our strongest commitment to values that have a claim
to being called "environmental." But the assumption that there is a
known set of values associated with these statutes, values that are
' For example, in polls taken over the period 1973-1994, a majority of those polled
consistently believed that government had too little or about the right amount of
involvement in environmental protection and that regulation had either struck about the
right balance or not gone far enough. See EVERETT CARLL LADD & KARLYN H. BOWMAN,
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ENVIRONMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER EARTH DAY 22-23
(1995). In a 1994 survey, 76% of those polled supported government regulation to protect
the environment, "even if it interferes with businesses' right to make their own decisions."
SUSAN MITCHELL, THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO AMERICAN ATITUDES 101 (1996).
' Not all may view it as positive, but few people express negative views. In Gallup
polls taken in 1989, 76% of Americans polled considered themselves "environmentalists."
In 1999, this number had dropped to 50%. http://www.publicagenda.org/issues
/pcc..detail.cfrn?issue_type=environment&list=5 (last visited Mar. 11, 2003). A recent poll
found that 12% of Americans polled identified themselves as active environmentalists and
61% identified themselves as sympathetic toward environmental concerns but not active.
Twenty percent identified themselves as neutral. Only 7% were unsympathetic (5%) or
didn't know (2%). Belden, Russonello & Stewart, Americans and Biodiversity: New
Perspectives in 2002, 11 (Feb. 2002). By a two-to-one margin, Americans who were polled
stated that they believe environmental protection is more important than producing
energy. William H. Meadows, Letter to the Editor, The Environment: Fight the Tide, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at A20, available at LEXIS.
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accurately captured by the muddy adjective "environmental," may be a
convenient and dangerous illusion.9
In reality, we may have little idea as to what values we are protecting
through our laws, and our rationale for doing so.10 My concern is that
unless we develop a better sense of where we are headed, we may find
out too late that we do not like the destination we are headed for."
Ignorance of the course we are following may permit environmental law
to evolve in a direction inconsistent with our values, whatever those
values may be, as individuals and as a society. Environmental ethics has
a key role to play in helping us to better understand just where we are
headed.
12
' This lack of clarity about what values are "environmental" is related to the
conceptual void that the term "environmentalism" currently masks. See JOSEPH M.
PETULLA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: VALUES, TACTICS, PRIORITIES 97-118 (1980) for a
discussion of the various views and values expressed through the environmental
movement. Robert C. Paehlke, in ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE
POLITICS 144-45 (1989), outlined thirteen central value assertions of environmentalism, but
acknowledged that not all environmentalists share all the values he identifies. His list,
derived from actions and writings of active environmentalists, would be a useful starting
point for discussion but is not a widely accepted understanding of what values are
"environmental." Paehlke's list reflects a strong version of environmentalism.
10 One might contest the need for clarity and conceive of environmental law as a stage
upon which a dynamic struggle occurs among a broad array of values. I reject this as an
adequate model for environmental law because such a struggle would necessarily be
undemocratic - one conducted by experts who can master the technical details, with
major shifts in embedded values subject to only superficial public scrutiny. One might
characterize the debate over tax policy in such a way. It produces a massive rambling
record of battles over social values won and lost, impenetrable to the ordinary individual.
However, tax law may be conceived of as a body of law focused on one set of tools that can
be deployed to advance many different social values, rather than a body of law developed
to focus on a particular set of values. I believe that a similarly limited conception of
environmental law sacrifices its promise and potential as a body of law developed to
incorporate important values previously excluded from our law and policy.
" By describing it as a destination, I do not mean to suggest that we have or should
have a single ethic that animates environmental law. Environmental law may function
well and be congruent with the majority's will without having a single identifiable ethic.
My concern is that whatever mix of ethics and values is embedded in the laws be known
and articulated so that the public and decisionmakers can better determine their views on
reform of existing law. I advocate more work to identify that mix of values and the relative
priority accorded these values, whether by design or merely in practice. The goal is to
identify the dominant ethics that emerge as compatible with our laws.
12 My focus in this paper is on the values our society advances by the adoption and
implementation of environmental laws (the values embedded in laws) which should be
distinguished from two other related but distinct topics: the values and ethics held by
individuals (individual ethics), and the values and ethics held by the public taken in the
aggregate (societal values). I argue that a focus on the former - the values embedded in
laws - is lacking and advocate work on this topic by scholars of environmental law and
philosophy. Study of the latter two topics - individual and societal ethics - is the
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To illustrate the challenge, consider the protection of wetlands under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 3 What are the values that this
important law advances? One of the key regulations that implements
Section 404 includes a long list of factors that must be considered in
deciding whether to fill a wetland. 4 It is an impressive and varied list.
One might dismiss the need for further inquiry, concluding that this list
tells us all we need to know about the values embedded in Section 404 as
implemented. But to identify accurately the values that Section 404
advances would require that we study how the law and regulations are
applied, not just how they appear on paper. 5 In practice, not all of the
province of sociologists, pollsters, environmental psychologists and environmental
philosophers, who have done significant work already to shed light on these subjects. Such
work is distinct from the project I describe, but can serve as an important complement for
the work I propose. Although my goal is not to undertake or advocate work on these latter
topics, a more rigorous discourse on the values embedded in law may ultimately lead to
greater clarity in the discourse about individual and societal ethics. Thus, the quest to
identify the values embedded in laws may contribute indirectly to the evolution of
individual and societal ethics.
1 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2003).
14 The regulation setting forth the Army Corps of Engineers' public interest review test
states:
The decision whether to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the
probable impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity and its
intended use on the public interest. Evaluation of the probable impact which the
proposed activity may have on the public interest requires a careful weighing of
all those factors which become relevant in each particular case. The benefits
which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal must be balanced
against its reasonably foreseeable detriments. The decision whether to authorize
a proposal, and if so, the conditions under which it will be allowed to occur, are
therefore determined by the outcome of this general balancing process. That
decision should reflect the national concern for both protection and utilization of
important resources. All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be
considered, including the cumulative effects thereof: among those are
conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands,
historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values,
land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and
conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production,
mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs
and welfare of the people. For activities involving 404 discharges, a permit will
be denied if the discharge that would be authorized by such permit would not
comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's 404(b)(1) guidelines.
Subject to the preceding sentence and any other applicable guidelines and
criteria (see §§ 320.2 and 320.3), a permit will be granted unless the district
engineer determines that it would be contrary to the public interest.
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2001).
15 Moreover, there are many other regulations, inter-agency memoranda, policies and
statutory sections that operate in conjunction with this regulation that would need to be
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factors mentioned in the regulations are considered equally. The data an
agency would need in order to consider some of these values may be
virtually impossible to obtain or cost-prohibitive. Other factors that
affect the law's implementation, such as budget or enforcement policy,
may in practice be dispositive. Moreover, it is not always clear what
values a particular factor advances. For example, what values are
advanced or promoted by considering "general environmental
concerns?"
Thus, it takes a concerted effort to identify what values we are
pursuing under our laws. It requires that we wade through the analysis
required under the relevant statutes and regulations for a start. Then, we
need to look at how the regulations are applied and interpreted by
agencies and courts, to determine whether some values are
systematically favored, while others are protected in name only.
Lawyers and legal scholars already typically engage in this type of
analysis, but only up to a point. We study how the laws, regulations,
and policies are interpreted and applied, and analyze whether agency
and court decisions are based on sound reasoning. What I am
suggesting is that this analysis needs an ethical dimension - a
translation of what happens under the law into the language of values.
The challenge such a task presents is that it demands work across the
boundary that divides law and philosophy. Both philosophers willing to
delve into environmental law and legal scholars interested in
environmental ethics will need to forge the path for this work.
The missing analysis would seek to determine what values and ethics
are embedded in Section 404. I have suggested that we need a detailed
and systematic analysis. 16 Some may challenge the notion that detailed
work is really necessary. For example, those familiar with Section 404 or
with environmental philosophy might be willing to forgo a close analysis
and offer as adequate the following general characterization: that
Section 404 reflects predominantly a human-centered and utilitarian
ethic - that, in general, Section 404 employs a balancing designed to
maximize human good. For purposes of considering whether detailed
analysis is really necessary, let us assume that this characterization is
generally correct, in this sense: that the values Section 404 advances are
more consistent with a human-centered utilitarianism than with any
considered.
16 See Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of An Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
63, 83-103 (2003) for a survey of the work done by legal scholars and philosophers in recent
years, how it may contribute to such a systematic project, and a discussion of the work that
remains.
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other coherent ethic (environmental or not) that we can identify. Even if
this is an accurate generalization, there is a fundamental problem with
relying on this general characterization as a statement of the ethic of
Section 404. By virtue of its effort to capture Section 404 in the abstract
vocabulary of pure philosophy, this characterization is misleading.
If we look more closely at Section 404, it is quickly apparent, that as
applied, the section incorporates a very incomplete calculation of "the
good." Rather than reflecting a pure and perfect utilitarianism, it reflects
what I call a bounded and imperfect utilitarianism. By these qualifiers, I
mean that the analysis is demonstrably inadequate on numerous scores.
If one imagines a utilitarian calculus that incorporates the insights of
ecology as perfectly as is humanly possible, that is not the utilitarian
calculus we are currently performing. 17 Our assessment of the benefits
provided by wetlands is severely constrained by data gaps as well as by
the limits of our understanding of complex natural systems. This is no
surprise to most who study environmental law. Critiques that highlight
the flaws of available analytic techniques are core contributions of legal
scholarship. 8 But I submit that we lack and need analysis that does
more than identify the flaws in regulatory and judicial decisions. We
need to refocus our attention away from the consistency and
completeness of regulatory and legal analysis, and onto the values
advanced by the flawed analytic techniques as they exist. We need a
language to express this, to describe the mix of values that actually
emerges from the flawed utilitarian calculus that our laws so often
embrace. This demands a new vocabulary, one that belongs neither to
philosophy nor to law.19  Philosophers can make a significant
" Beyond the often noted exclusion of hard-to-quantify values of the environment, the
exclusion of values like fairness and justice for systematically underrepresented groups like
the poor and people of color also distorts the utilitarian calculus used under our statutes.
See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Advancing Environmental Justice Norms, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95
(2003), simultaneously published in 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 95 (2003).
" Specific critiques have effectively highlighted the inadequacies of utilitarian
analyses under a wide array of statutes as implemented. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998); Oliver A. Houck, The
Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental
Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1989); Kristen S. Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Justice and
Procedural Safeguards: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 525 (2000);
Kristen S. Shrader-Frechette, Academy Recommendations on the Proposed Yucca Mountain
Waste Repository: Overview and Criticisms, 8 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 25 (1997). Here
I argue for the value of moving beyond a technical critique to identify the ethical
implications of the bounded and imperfect utilitarian approach.
" In his 1991 book, TOWARD UNITY AMONG ENVIRONMENTALISTS, Bryan Norton
commented on the absence of an accepted vocabulary for discussing environmental values
and focused on developing a common vocabulary that captured the shared elements of
University of California, Davis
contribution by helping to develop this vocabulary, and lawyers and
legal scholars can contribute by using it.2' The work to uncover and
articulate the values embedded in our laws represents a significant
challenge that will require thinking that transcends disciplinary
boundaries - work and discussion fostered by symposia like this one.
C. What Can We Gain from Unearthing the Ethics in Environmental Law?
Having described the type of work I advocate, let me turn to the
question of its worth. Why do we need a better understanding of the
values embedded in our laws? Why do we need to be able to accurately
describe the mix of values that Section 404 tends to protect? I contend
that the public and decisionmakers need a better sense of our current
bearings in order to validate or invalidate popular assumptions.
Consider the portrait of Section 404 offered above: let us assume for a
moment that the most accurate description of the ethic embedded in it is
a bounded and imperfect human-centered utilitarianism - in other
words, a utilitarianism that does not fully account even for the total
value to humans of wetlands. Contrast this with the public narrative we
tell about Section 404. Section 404 is widely viewed as one of the
brightest stars of the environmental law constellation. And rightly so.
Wetlands have what we might call "most-favored-ecosystem" status
under our legal regime, while many uplands ecosystems are left
relatively unprotected. But the fact that Section 404 is one of our
stronger environmental laws does not mean that it reflects any uniquely
environmental values or a unique way of valuing the environment. Yet,
the public narrative may reinforce the assumption that environmental
law is a pure reflection of some indistinct but noble set of environmental
values. This may contrast with the reality that our laws, like Section 404,
environmentalists' worldviews. NORTON, supra note 1, at 6,92. Norton's goal was to study
how despite differing worldviews, environmentalists often were in fact in agreement about
their objectives on major policy issues. Id. at 90. Although my goal here is slightly
different - to find a language that accurately captures not individuals' worldviews, but
the values embedded in our law and policy - a common vocabulary might serve both
purposes. Like the worldviews Norton sought to capture, the mix of values embedded in
our laws and their justifications are somewhat messy and not necessarily coherent. See id.
at 93.
20 Some of the challenges this work will entail and the need for this work is described
in Flournoy, supra note 16, at 83-88. One interesting problem about creating such a
vocabulary is that it needs to be a shared vocabulary used systematically in law and policy
discourse. While academics in law and philosophy are those most likely to develop a
workable language, the culture of academia prizes individual achievement - atomistic
contributions. In contrast, to be effective, this vocabulary must be agreed on and widely
used. Almost by definition, it will need to result from a collaborative effort.
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often protect a wide array of very traditional human values, and
uniquely environmental values or ethics are at best only partially
reflected.
What if this is true broadly? What if the values protected by our
environmental laws are human values that differ only slightly from the
values protected by the common law of nuisance, cloaked in the
appealing veil of environmentalism? It is possible that instead of an
identity between the values in our laws and those held by the public,
there is a significant disjuncture." At present, I contend that it is difficult
for an expert, let alone a lay person, to know if this is the case.
Such ignorance can interfere with democratic participation. The easy
equation of environmental laws and environmentalism, which is
reinforced by our inability to describe accurately the values of our laws,
discourages serious public discourse about why we care about the
environment. If we do not ever consider or discuss as a society what we
value and why, we are like the rowers I described at the start: backs into
the wind, rowing in unison with no idea where we are headed, but
convinced it is where we all mean to go. A clearer picture of the
embedded values can correct any erroneous assumptions and validate
accurate ones. Moreover, the discourse involved in providing a more
accurate account of the values protected by our laws may promote wider
attention to the ethical questions, challenging people to consider why
they support environmental protection.
Thus, I propose that legal scholars and philosophers work to enhance
public understanding of the values embedded in our laws. When
members of the public are confronted with a clearer picture of what
values are advanced by our current laws and policies, they can
determine whether or not these laws comport with their ethical
intuitions. If they find that the laws are consistent with their ethical
intuitions, we will have a stronger public commitment to support
existing laws. If not, the public can support efforts to reform the law in
any direction - to enhance protection of non-environmental human
values like autonomy or to enhance protection of the social or intrinsic
2 I do not assume that the values embedded in law are now or ever will be a perfect
reflection of any one individual's ethics, nor of the values held by the majority. But in
general, if our representative democracy is functioning, our laws should evolve in a
direction that favors the values held by the majority, with concessions to prevent
oppression of the minority and erosions of fundamental liberties. Therefore, an
understanding of the values that our laws advance seems a valuable tool to aid the public
and lawmakers to determine how well our democracy is functioning in the realm of
environmental law and policy.
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value of the environment, as they see fit.
Beyond the democratic benefits of better public understanding of the
values advanced under our laws, this work is important to the long-term
efficacy of environmental law and policy. Engagement with
environmental issues by the public and changes in individual and civic
behavior will only result if we care about something at stake. If, as I
suggest, the American public lacks clarity about what it values about the
environment, then the public is less likely to be engaged and responsive
on issues of environmental policy. As philosopher James Rachels
explains, in describing where ethical argument leads us:
As Hume observed, when we come to the last reason, we mention
something we care about. Nothing can count as an ultimate reason
for or against a course of conduct unless we care about that thing in
some way. In the absence of any emotional involvement, there are
no reasons for action. The fact that the building is on fire is a reason
for me to leave only if I care about not being burned; the fact that
children are starving is a reason for me to do something only if I
care about their plight. 22
In short, unless we have a sufficient grasp both of our own values and
of how a law or decision or action affects something we care about, we
will not respond. The process of gaining clarity, of discussing the values
at stake, may itself promote more reasoned thinking. 23 Deliberation may
promote ethical development. 24 One does not need to know how
' James Rachels, Can Ethics Provide Answers?, in APPLIED ETHICS AND ETHICAL THEORY
3, 20 (David M. Rosenthal & Fadlou Shehadi eds., 1988); see also Holly Doremus, Shaping the
Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233 (2003),
simultaneously published in 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POLY'Y J. 233 (2003).
' "What people care about is itself sensitive to pressure from the deliberative process
and can change as a result of thought .... Someone might not care very much about
something before he thinks it through, but come to feel differently once he has thought it
over .... Aristotle, Butler, and others emphasized that responsible moral judgment must
be based on a full understanding of the facts; but, they added, after the facts are established
a separate cognitive process is required for the agent to understand fully the import of
what he or she knows. it is necessary not merely to know the facts, but to rehearse them
carefully in one's mind, in an impartial, nonevasive way. Then one will have the kind of
knowledge on which moral judgment may be based." Rachels, supra note 22, at 21.
24 Rachels points out that we may "know" the facts about a problem, but be like
Aristotle's "'drunkard reciting the verses of Empedocles,' but without understanding their
meaning," id. at 21, in contrast to a person who has thought carefully about what one
knows. Rachels gives the example that all of us know there are starving children in the
world. Yet we will spend money on trivial things for ourselves rather than to help ensure
there is food for them. But when something shows us vividly what it must be like to be a
starving orphan, such as a picture or story in the paper, many people are suddenly moved
to action. It is not just new information that they have received - surely they knew that
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deliberation might affect Americans' views on environmental values, to
believe that greater thought and attention to these issues is a desirable
end in itself.
Because there is ultimately no reason for any action, nor for law that
regulates action, unless we care, environmental philosophy matters for
environmental law. The steady support for increased regulation to limit
our impact on the environment over the past thirty years suggests that
American society does care about some values associated with the
environment. If we are to change our current pattern of conduct with
regard to the environment - including our action through government
- we need both information and motivation to deliberate. Several
characteristics of environmental problems - their technical complexity,
the scientific uncertainty and extremely long time horizons attending
them, and the wide array of values they engage - discourage clear
thinking about the relevant values. The possibility that a majority may
wish to change our current patterns makes the effort to clarify our
thinking about why we care worthwhile.
A last point about the importance of identifying our laws' underlying
values relates to the greatest long-term challenge for environmental law
and environmental ethics: reconciling our valuing of the environment
with other values that may be incompatible in a given case. This is a
challenge many environmental philosophers recognize and wrestle with,
and one brought home to environmental lawyers by the rise of the
property rights movement beginning in the 1980s.
As I suggested with reference to Section 404, it appears that we
generally do embrace a wide range of human values in our
environmental laws,"' but our narrative about environmental laws does
not reveal that. At present, environmental laws are perceived as a blunt
counterweight to other human values. Although it is true that some
legislation recognizes values beyond traditional human values, the
narrative that environmental laws exclude other human values is a
powerful and misleading claim that facilitates attacks on environmental
laws.26
there were people in such situations. But they were moved to think about the implications and
then to act. Rachels, supra note 22, at 21-22; see also Doremus, supra note 22.
' See Flournoy, supra note 16, at 104-07 for a further elaboration of the many
traditional human-centered values weighed under the Corps of Engineers and EPA
regulations under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
26 This is true in the field of natural resources law, but less so in the realm of pollution
control law, where protection of human health is often clearly a paramount value of
regulation. Thus, in pollution control regulation, the values advanced by the laws and why
we care about them are more commonly understood. The ethical conflict is typically
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Restoration of the Everglades, an eight billion dollar project most
would identify as serving purely "environmental" values, provides a
good example of the inaccuracy of this story. In reality, the bipartisan
support for federal funding of the largest and most ambitious restoration
project ever reflected a broad coalition that sought to advance a wide
range of values. The restoration of the natural system - of the sheet
flow that is the lifeblood of this wetland ecosystem - was spotlighted.
But other values - specifically an adequate supply of drinking water to
support expanded population and development in South Florida - were
also prominent in the restoration plan. 27 This conflict of values at the
core of the project has caused and will cause serious tension.
For example, the pressure to experiment on a large scale with
controversial technology for storing water, such as Aquifer Storage and
Recovery, was driven partly by development needs, which vastly
expanded the quantities of water that had to be restored) 8 Similarly, the
failure to explore some alternatives that would be ecologically preferable
reflects a valuing of existing and potential human uses of the historic
Everglades for agriculture and development. Acknowledging more
openly that humans are part of the equation - without pretending that
every equation that includes humans and the environment is a win/win
situation - is an important step.29 I am not suggesting that it is bad to
consider human needs alongside other values. To the contrary, I am
suggesting it is unavoidable. Concealing these more mundane and, to
some, less palatable values under the appealing guise of
environmentalism may not promote the best decisions or ethical
engagement with the real issues by the public.
The task of uncovering the ethics embedded in our laws may represent
a significant challenge that no one person or discipline can hope to
remove from the path of environmental law and philosophy. Work
across disciplinary boundaries, fostered by symposia like this one, will
be crucial. But a first step is to identify the challenge, and to address the
problem by developing a better account of what values we are pursuing
through implementation of our environmental laws. Given the public's
framed as one that pits human well being (represented by health) against autonomy and
human well being (represented by economic opportunity or jobs.)
27 The political success of the effort to secure federal funding to support restoration
reflected the strength of this unusual coalition. See Mary Doyle, Implementing Everglades
Restoration, 17 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 59, 61-62 (2001).
' Michael Grunwald, A Rescue Plan, Bold and Uncertain: Scientists, Federal Officials
Question Project's Benefitfor Ailing Ecosystem, WASH. POST, June 23, 2002, at Al.
On the dangerous allure of win-win, see William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Myth of Win-
Win: Misdiagnosis in the Business of Reassembling Nature, 42 ARiz. L. REV. 297 (2000).
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significant interest in environmental issues and identification with
environmental values,' detailed accounts showing the values that our
laws actually protect may usefully refocus the debate. A clearer picture
of the ethics we currently advance through our laws can provide
landmarks from which to navigate as we move forward.31
II. BUILDING AN ETHIC FROM THE GROUND UP
Having suggested a first necessary step towards bringing
environmental philosophy down to earth, let me turn to a second step:
what I call building an ethic from the ground up. It may help to think of
this in contrast to Professor Stone's study.32 His very interesting and
useful investigation looked to see if environmental ethics had influenced
or motivated key decisionmakers - legislators and judges - in shaping
our laws. In other words, he was looking to see if environmental ethics
had entered the legal system from the top down. As he reported, there
was very little sign that it had. In contrast, my inquiry focuses on how
ideas from environmental philosophy may start to inform thinking about
environmental issues from the ground up, among the public. This is a
slow process at best, but one that is important to a fully informed debate
about our future.
To describe this process, I will rely on a generalization about the
dominant ethics embedded in our environmental laws: I will assume
that most of our environmental laws, as implemented, reflect
predominantly an ethical impulse that is both anthropocentric and
utilitarian.33 Not all our laws are entirely consistent with a purely
utilitarian ethic.34 There are standards and provisions of our laws that
incorporate values in ways that may be compatible with recognizing
nonhuman nature's intrinsic value. But I will assume that the ethical
core of our environmental laws, as implemented, emphasizes human
See supra note 8.
In the hopes of provoking discussion about how this work might proceed, I have
described one way to achieve these goals through application of concepts drawn from
philosophy in the context of legal analysis. Flournoy, supra note 16, at 103-08. That
description also highlights the significant challenge of building a common vocabulary to
capture the diverse reasons for caring about the environment. Id. at 83-88.
32 Christopher D. Stone, Do Morals Matter? The Influence of Ethics on Courts and Congress
in Shaping U.S. Environmental Policies, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 13 (2003), simultaneously
published in 27 ENVIRONs ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 13 (2003).
As previously discussed, this generalization is inadequate. See supra text
accompanying notes 16-20.
The Endangered Species Act is perhaps the best example of a statute that reflects an
ethic that appears not to be utilitarian, though it too has strong measures of that ethic.
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values, and that the justification that best fits with our legal standards is
a very bounded and imperfect utilitarianism rather than, for example, a
biocentric theory of intrinsic value.
Given this assumption, what is the relevance of environmental
philosophy? Environmental philosophers are making contributions on
many fronts, but the most visible is work that develops coherent theories
promoting less destructive relationships with the nonhuman world.
When one surveys the literature on environmental philosophy, the most
prevalent focus is the challenge to identify a coherent alternative to a
human-centered utilitarian theoryi3 Thus the first step most
philosophers take is to reject the dominant human-centered utilitarian
ethic.
This is essential work that may provide alternative ethical frameworks
for people who are dissatisfied with the ethics reflected in traditional
Western philosophy and our current practices. In other words, people
who already know that they reject the dominant ethic may immediately
benefit by the insight into alternative ethics. But the vast majority of
citizens who may consider themselves sympathetic to environmentalism
may not identify easily with these radically different ethics. So
mainstream philosophical discourse on environmental ethics may not
engage the American public on relevant ethical questions. Philosophical
environmental ethics may be so far removed from lay values and
worldviews as to be irrelevant and inaccessible. Engaging a broader
swath of the public on the question of what matters is what I call
building an ethic from the ground up. This paper suggests that a key
step towards such engagement may be the development of a new
discourse about environmental values.
Initially, the term environmentalism may have served as an adequate
focus for our discourse. It captured and expressed the public desire to
embrace a new ethic, new values, and prompted deep thought about our
relationship with the environment. But the meaning of the term has
been so diluted over time that commentators have noted that it is now on
a par with apple pie and motherhood,6 something most people embrace
and only a few view unsympathetically. 37  Today, environmentalism
seems to suggest a posture supportive of environmental laws as they
exist or with moderate reforms. It may be that environmentalism today
See supra note 1.
' David Easter, Activism in a Moderate World: Media Portrayals and Audience
Interpretation of Environmental Activisim, in EARTHTALK: COMMUNICATION EMPOWERMENT
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION 45-47 (Star A. Muir & Thomas L. Veenendall eds., 1996).
"' See supra note 8.
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lacks a core meaning distinct from the dominant human-centered
utilitarian ethic?3 Use of the word "environmentalism" does not lead to
thoughtful engagement with the ethical and practical problems that arise
under the current dominant ethic. It is a question mark too often used as
a period.
One might argue that to cure this void, coherent alternative theories
are needed and that the theory-building work being done by
philosophers is the most urgent need. However, it seems possible that
the leap required of people if they are to understand and embrace a
coherent environmental ethic is too difficult for most, given current
attitudes and the limited public discourse about underlying values.
Coherent environmental ethics are compartmentalized as "radical" and
rejected, leaving a vast undefined realm of "mainstream"
environmentalism. Most people believe themselves concerned about the
environment, even though that commitment may be one without well-
defined content. To challenge the public's comfortable self image as
"environmentally friendly," we may need concepts that are not so
radically removed from utilitarianism but which frame the ethical and
practical shortcomings of our current ethics as applied to environmental
problems. 39 In other words, concepts that show the possibility and value
' This is not to say that there cannot be a critique of a particular law, policy or
decision that would be generally accepted to be "environmentalist." For example a critique
of President Bush's Clear Skies Initiative because it allows industry to avoid retrofitting air
pollution equipment might be widely accepted to represent an environmentalist
perspective. But such a critique can be made based entirely on values that are consistent
with the dominant human-centered utilitarian ethic. The term environmentalist lacks
coherent content to distinguish it from the dominant ethics. There is no widely accepted
sense of what values an environmentalist commits to or what reasons motivate an
environmentalist to care about these values. Environmentalism encompasses all possible
values associated with the nonhuman environment and all possible reasons for caring.
' Most environmental philosophers who explore alternative ethics have rejected the
notion of an ecologically and ethically enlightened human-centered utilitarianism. See, e.g.,
CALLICOTFr, supra note 1. They see the flaws with the dominant ethic as fundamental.
From their view, no solution short of an entirely new ethical grounding will produce a
sound relationship with the nonhuman world. I do not seek to convince them otherwise.
My point is to suggest that in addition to their contributions through theory-building, other
philosophers may usefully apply their skill to the challenge of framing concepts that will
not solve the fundamental philosophical dilemma but may help the public to understand
and confront the ethical issues that motivate environmental philosophers. Bryan Norton
and Andrew Light are among the philosophers who share the view that the focus on non-
anthropocentric ethics has limited environmental philosophy's impact. See, e.g., Andrew
Light, Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Policy, 33
METAPHILOSOPHY 426, 427, 435-36, 444 (2002); Bryan Norton, Which Morals Matter: Freeing
Moral Reasoning from Ideology, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81 (2003), simultaneously published in 27
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 81 (2003).
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of more ecologically enlightened ethics, but which do not require
wholesale acceptance of a radically altered worldview, may have value.40
A. Towards a New Ethical Discourse: Stepping Stones
This paper emphasizes the value of an environmental ethics discourse
that can reach a wide segment of the public. Concepts that can frame the
ethical issues in a more accessible form may help those who are not
completely satisfied with the dominant bounded and imperfect,
anthropocentric utilitarian ethics embedded in our policies and laws.
Therefore, I advocate developing concepts that can serve as points of
departure from where the majority is today - concepts that frame the
ethical issues in an accessible form and offer a new direction for those
41whose ethical impulses diverge from current dominant norms.
Such concepts may fill a gap that exists between legal scholars' work
that is directed at improving decisionmakers' analytic techniques and
philosophers' work to develop coherent ethical theories. Concepts and
vocabulary that draw on both philosophy and law may be useful tools
that will help members of the public to understand the full implications
of current laws in ethical terms, and to identify or envision practices and
policies consistent with their evolving individual ethical intuitions.
Developing these concepts will require that we broaden the definition of
appropriate work for lawyers and philosophers. Philosophers'
contribution cannot be limited to developing and justifying a coherent
alternative completely apart from human-centered utilitarianism. And
lawyers' contribution cannot be limited to critiquing current legal
standards or decisionmaking techniques. Philosophers must help us to
create a discourse that describes ways of valuing the environment that
builds on people's current values, and lawyers must analyze the extent
to which existing and proposed laws are compatible with these values.
Ultimately, such concepts may prove more radical in practice than
ecocentric ethical theories, in that they may enable ethical transformation
that would otherwise not occur.
Metaphorically, we can think of such concepts as stepping stones -
ideas that help people to find their way past some of the constraints of
This parallels Holly Doremus' observation on the need for "gateway" behaviors -
small, relatively easily accomplished steps - as a key step in turning people's values into
behaviors. Doremus, supra note 22. What I call stepping stones could be called "gateway"
environmental ethics.
" Such concepts may serve the function Eugene Hargrove ascribes to ethics: helping
people to perceive issues rather than providing neat answers that resolve questions in
every situation. EUGENE HARGROVE, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIcS 5-8 (1989).
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traditional ethics. Such concepts should focus public attention on the
constraints imposed by traditional utilitarian ethics and bring into view
the possibility of an ethic that addresses these constraints. These
constraints include inadequate capacity to deal with long time horizons,
uncertainty, integrated decisionmaking, social equity, and values that are
not easily monetized. Stepping stones, unlike a true environmental
ethic, may not provide coherent and complete responses to these
constraints, but by making the issues salient for the public, they may
represent a necessary step in any widespread ethical evolution.
Where an environmental ethic might be described as requiring a leap
from current dominant ethics, stepping stones require only a small step.
They invite contemplation of change by highlighting the constraints of
current ethics, but they do not demand a complete ethical
transformation. To be effective, a stepping stone must have broad
resonance with the public and provide a context for confronting some of
the challenges that any environmental ethic will have to overcome,
including long time horizons, scientific uncertainty and the limitations of
the dominant economic framework.42
One objection to the work of developing stepping stones may be that
this is not the work of either philosophy or law. Under this view,
environmental philosophy should properly focus on developing
coherent alternatives to traditional ethics. Enlightened human-centered
ethics will never transcend the ethical inadequacies of human-centered
ethics and thus are compromised from the start. But if environmental
philosophy is to take root, if it is to reach its potential as both an
intellectual and moral tool for people interested in it, some accessible
groundwork must be laid.4 Further, the work to identify such concepts
" These challenges are distinct from the central philosophical challenge of expanding
our moral focus to include nonhuman nature. Several of the speakers in this symposium
have identified these well known challenges. In his book EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS,
Christopher Stone identified the long time horizons over which the consequences of human
action may be revealed, the broad geographic horizons across which localized actions may
affect the environment, and the challenges of extending moral concepts to nonhuman
entities, both real and artificial, such as nonhuman elements of nature and corporations.
STONE, supra note 1, at 30. As Stone shows, not all of these inhere uniquely in applying
morals to environmental problems; some result from modem technological development.
But the challenges must be addressed if environmental ethics are to effect meaningful
change in human relationships with the nonhuman world. In ECO-PRAGMATISM, Daniel
Farber focused on incommensurability of economic and physical harms, long timelines and
scientific uncertainty. FARBER, supra note 2, at 1. Laura Westra draws on Hans Jonas'
statement of the problems of traditional western ethics which include the assumption of
temporal and geographic proximity. WESTRA, supra note 2, at 6.
" Andrew Light asserts the importance of building on the prevailing anthropocentric
view. Light, supra note 39, at 444.
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is not entirely removed from philosophical concerns, but often lies at the
boundary between philosophy and law. Some environmental
philosophers and legal scholars are already working in this vein.44 My
goal here is to suggest that more common effort on this endeavor is
essential.
To illustrate the potential value of this approach, I explore one concept
- sustainability - which holds promise as a stepping stone. If
systematically integrated into debates on law and policy -not as a legal
standard, but as a concept that frames the ethical questions that law and
policy raise - it may enable environmental philosophy to grow from the
ground up. Sustainability is not the only such concept, but it is one that
warrants attention for reasons that I explore below.4
B. Sustainability as a Stepping Stone
A first question is how to define sustainability. The most widely
accepted definition of sustainability is providing for the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs.46 Decisions or policies are deemed sustainable only if they
Bryan Norton, Laura Westra, Kristen Shrader-Frechette, and Andrew Light have all
explicitly defined and followed approaches that begin with practices in the world and then
look to see what philosophy can bring to bear on that reality. See Light, supra note 39;
NORTON, SEARCHING FOR SUSTAINABI1TY, supra note 2, at 1-37; NORTON, TOWARDS UNITY,
supra note 1, at 12; Kristen A. Shrader-Frechette, Ecology, in A COMPANION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 304, 312-14 (Dale Jamieson ed., 2001); WESTRA, supra note 2,
at xv.
" Daniel Farber's eco-pragmatism is another. FARBER, supra note 2. While eco-
pragmatism is distinct from sustainability, it shares some attributes with sustainability,
drawing on a low discount rate to enable considering future generations and applying the
precautionary principle to shift the burden of proof. Id. at 154-55, 170-74. In his
conclusions, Farber explicitly describes his work in terms of "sustainable environmental
law." Id. at 199. Another example of work developing an alternative ethical framework is
Carol Rose's exploration of the concepts of nature as "a given" versus as "a gift." Rose
draws on ideas from the realm of property that may help shift how we value nonhuman
nature by changing the story we tell about our relationship to it. Carol M. Rose, Given-ness
and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1 (1994). Edith Brown
Weiss's exploration of the property law concept of the trust is another example, and one
which has close links to the future-generational focus of sustainability. EDITH BROWN
WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY,
AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989). Joseph Sax's work on the public trust doctrine
laid the foundations on which much understanding and interpretation of our current
natural resources law rests. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970). Its limited ethical focus on the
relationship between the government and the public may explain our need to search for
additional concepts to address challenges such as uncertainty and long time horizons.
* WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987).
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incorporate consideration of three co-equal factors: ecology, economics
and social equity.47 Because of the explicit focus on human needs, the
concept is compatible with anthropocentrism. 48  On its face,
sustainability values the environment and economic activity, not
intrinsically but for their utility to humans. The explicit valuing of
equity among humans in the allocation of environmental and economic
benefits seems to introduce a complementary rights-based approach.
So what is potentially useful about this concept? First, let me be clear
about what sustainability does not accomplish. It does not address the
problem that motivates so much of the work in environmental
philosophy; that is, it does not expand the community of morally valued
entities beyond humans.49 To that extent, it is consistent with a calculus
of utility like that employed under many laws today. It does not appeal
to any inchoate non-anthropocentric intuitions that members of the
public may possess. However, sustainability has six attributes that
endow it with the potential to expand public discourse and to help us
confront problems that must be addressed if any environmental
philosophy is to take root. By framing and focusing public debate on
these important issues, sustainability may facilitate future ethical
development.
First, the concept of sustainability provides an elegant way to address
the critical problem of long time horizons. 0 Legal scholars have done
much that shows the failures of current cost-benefit methodology in
dealing with long time horizons. Scholars have revealed both the
controversial value choices about time horizons made in current policies
and the flawed technical analysis sometimes performed under our
41 Id. at 9-11. I use the term sustainability in place of sustainable development because
of its greater flexibility in application to any decision whether or not a development
decision. Bryan Norton has analyzed sustainability in detail in his recent work and
highlights the dangers of a weak definition. See NORTON, supra note 2, at 168-79, 225-39.
' There are efforts by some commentators to infuse it with an explicitly biocentric
meaning. See, e.g., Cesar Cuello Nieto, Toward a Holistic Approach to the Ideal of
Sustainability, 2 PHIL. & TECH. 41, 44 (Winter 1997); Paul B. Thompson, Sustainability as a
Norm, 2 PHIL. & TECH. 75, 80, 91 (Winter 1997). This potential for compatibility with
biocentric impulses is another positive feature. Sustainability may not only provide a
stepping stone to a new ethic but may itself be transformed.
" See Stan Godlovitch, Things Change: So Whither Sustainability,? 20 ENvTL. ETHICs 291,
300 (1998).
' As Professor Norton's recent work suggests, experts in economics and ecology
ultimately disagree on the key question of the appropriate time horizon when discussing
sustainability, in part because there are value choices embedded in the decision. NORTON,
SEARCHING FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 2, at 225-28.
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current laws, which tends to undervalue future harms."1 But much of the
work is necessarily very technical and abstract, removed from the
concrete conflicts that shape public debate. It may be critically important
that the public be engaged directly with this central moral issue in
environmental policy.
Sustainability can provide an anchor for debate about the appropriate
time horizon to consider in law and policy. The challenge of extending
our ethical horizon to include a longer timeframe is an enormously
important one for anyone who cares about the environment, under
almost any justification for caring. Sustainability is a concept that can
perform this heavy lifting. Future generations of humans are front and
center and must be considered. The questions of how far into the future
we want to consider and how we weigh our interest in the future against
current needs are not easy. But as Bryan Norton's work shows,
sustainability frames the issue and focuses attention on this key value
choice that we must make."2
Second, by virtue of its explicit focus on environmental impacts over a
long time horizon, sustainability demands that we employ the tools and
knowledge of ecology to understand these consequences. Of course, the
same claim could be made of a utilitarian philosophy: accurately
determining the greatest good for the greatest number demands that we
employ our best methodologies to determine the human consequences of
our actions. However, sustainability suggests the need for an antidote to
current practices in two ways. First, the emphasis on the environment as
an equal factor of consideration alongside economics and equity elevates
the importance of ecological impacts and our analysis of them. Further,
sustainability envisions integrated decisionmaking, a key prerequisite to
incorporating ecology effectively into decisions.' Again, this is not a
panacea, but a spotlight that can illuminate the issues, bringing them
into the public's field of vision.
Third, sustainability focuses attention on the role of uncertainty and
the ethical implications of our choices related to burdens of proof.
Engaging people on the subject of scientific uncertainty and burdens of
proof is likely to induce glazed eyes; sustainability provides a concrete
entry point for initiating public debate on the relevant moral questions.
Inadequate data and limited understanding about the consequences of
51 See, e.g. Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39
(1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911 (1999).
52 NORTON, SEARCHING FOR SUSTAINABILITy, supra note 2, at 421-46.
s See John C. Dernbach, National Governance, in STUMBLING TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY
725 (John C. Dembach ed., 2002).
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human activity on the environment have long been recognized by
scholars as serious challenges to developing effective environmental
policy and law. No matter what our ethical stance, we must all confront
the central question of how we ought to deal with uncertainty. This is
not purely a philosophical problem. But as a practical matter, if an
approach to uncertainty is not embedded in the ethical framework we
apply, then questions about coping with uncertainty may be wrongly
relegated, as they often are today, to the realm of technical questions,
removed from public debate and concern.
Sustainability has promise for bringing the question of uncertainty
back into the public eye because it embodies the premise that all
decisions must preserve options for future generations. Sustainability
reframes the debate, thus introducing the possibility for a different
approach to uncertainty than that embedded in current law, policy, and
ethics. In place of legal standards that demand proof of harm in the face
of uncertainty, sustainability raises the possibility that we should assess
human decisions to see if they are sustainable. As such, the concept of
sustainability can expose the significant issue of how to assess
technological optimism in light of what is unknowni 4
Because sustainability provides a positive standard against which to
measure human activity, it facilitates placing the burden of proof of
sustainability on those whose actions deplete resources rather than on
those who advocate protective regulation. Asking whether a given
activity is sustainable redirects the focus from whether human activity
causes harm. In the harm prevention context, the relative concreteness
of the term "harm" serves to focus our attention on the issue of harm as
the operative inquiry. This focus on whether harm has occurred gives
force to the argument for placing the burden of proof (and thus of
uncertainty) on those who would prove harm. Because sustainability is
a positive attribute of a decision, a focus on sustainability may lend at
least rhetorical strength to the argument for shifting the burden of
coping with uncertainty to those who seek to justify their activities as
sustainable.55  Further, the international discourse on sustainability,
' The debate over the appropriate assumptions regarding resource substitution and
technological optimism is highlighted in Thompson, supra note 48, at 79. Adopting
sustainability as a stepping stone makes the outcome of this debate of great importance,
but it does not resolve it. Its value is largely in framing the issue and confronting the
public with the question.
" The Republican Party's careful attention to its "message" on environmental issues in
recent months, described in Jennifer Lee, A Call for Softer, Greener Language: G.O.P. Adviser
Offers Linguistic Tactics for Environmental Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at 1, 24, suggests
the practical power of language and rhetoric in shaping public debate.
University of California, Davis
which has made the precautionary principle one of its operational
elements, also supports this shift.
Of course, just as the argument is made under current law that it is
unreasonable to ask economic actors to prove a negative (that there will
be no harm to health or the environment), there will undoubtedly still be
claims that it is unreasonable to ask economic actors to prove such a
broad positive (that a decision is sustainable). In other words,
sustainability will not eliminate controversy over policies on the burden
of proof and how to cope with uncertainty. But broader adoption of the
concept of sustainability would remind us that this is a value question
and not a technical issue. It may, therefore, renew public interest in, and
attention to, the question of the burden of proof in light of uncertainty.
Fourth, sustainability embraces the reality that a broad array of human
values must inevitably be weighed along with values associated with the
environment, whether in a traditional or a non-traditional ethical
framework. Other human values do not simply disappear when values
56related to interactions with the nonhuman environment appear.
Resolving conflicts that exist among values is perhaps the most
important context in which environmental values are invoked 7
Advocates on all sides of environmental debates may not always want to
highlight the fact that environmental protection measures that make us
feel virtuous often serve our self-interest as well. But the prevailing
polarized discourse and false dichotomies impede mature debate about
environmental ethics and may undermine long-term support for
environmental law. Sustainability may provide an antidote for extreme
polarization by recasting the debate to emphasize that decisions affecting
the environment inevitably affect other human values. Sustainability
makes a virtue of this necessary tension by acknowledging the need to
consider other values. Recognizing that environmental statutes and an
environmental worldview already incorporate rather than exclude these
other values is an important step. Incorporation of a broad array of
values, linked with a long time horizon, ecological principles, and social
equity, may have tremendous power to enrich public debate.
There is an obvious risk that comes with the inclusion of non-
environmental human values alongside environmental values. The risk
is that despite the nominal embracing of the environment, other more
Oliver Houck expressed this humorously as the "Nothing in Environmental Law is
More Than Fifty Percent" rule: that a wide array of human values and concerns creep into
every equation under every law, however absolute and exclusive of those concerns the
statute appears. Oliver A. Houck, Are Humans Part of Ecosystems? 28 ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (1998).
' See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
[Vol. 37:53
2003] Building an Environmental Ethic from the Ground Up 77
easily quantifiable values will outweigh non-economic environmental
values. Many commentators have pointed out this failing under current
laws that mandate cost-benefit analysis. If this critique of sustainability
proves correct, sustainability will produce decisions no different than
those we have today or worse. For this reason, embracing the broad
range of values associated with sustainability may justifiably be rejected
by many advocates in the polarized debate on environmental law and
policy. But the work of philosophers, scientists, and legal scholars can
help us avoid this peril by siving the concept of sustainability meaning
and preventing its dilution.
The fifth promising aspect of sustainability is its inclusion of social
equity as a third factor to be considered along with the environment and
economics. By including social equity, sustainability introduces a
human value that, although not necessarily in tension with valuing of
the environment, is often excluded from consideration and ignored in
environmental law and policy. The breadth and depth of the
environmental justice movement has demonstrated the importance of
social equity in the allocation of environmental benefits and burdens.59
Sustainability incorporates concern about environmental justice rather
than relegating it to a separate domain.
Finally, there is one practical advantage sustainability has:
accessibility. Sustainability may be a particularly strong starting point
from which to reach people who are interested in the environment
because it comports with people's current ethical intuitions. Results of a
recent survey showed that the top justification people gave for caring
about environmental protection was the current generation's
responsibility to future generations.6 The reason selected most
For example, Bryan Norton has proposed an approach to defining sustainability
based in what he calls scientific contextualism - an approach that evaluates impacts of
decisions on future generations not only in terms of severity of effects, but also in terms of
reversibility, which leads to the notion that some obligations are "non-negotiable" because
they "perpetuate the conditions necessary for the continuation of the human species and of
its culture. NORTON, SEARCHING FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 2, at 174. Norton's
approach also embodies a holistic approach - one that cannot be reduced to the
preferences of individuals - and it accounts for the systemic nature of ecosystems. Id. at
174-76. See also Dernbach, supra note 53. Oliver Houck's reflections on the concept of
ecosystem management offer interesting insights on how to avoid having humans
dominate an equation of which they are part. Houck, supra note 56.
- See, e.g., KENNETH MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995);
CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY &
REGULATION (2002); THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999).
Belden, Russonello & Stewart, supra note 8, at 6. Individuals were asked to choose
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frequently as being a "very important reason" to protect biodiversity
was biodiversity's value in providing natural services to humans.61 Thus
sustainability shows promise as a stepping stone from current ethics and
values held by the public. It builds both on the utilitarian justification
most people identify as foremost among their reasons for caring about
the environment, and on their concern for future generations. In
addition, sustainability seems compatible with views that are grounded
in a sense of religious duty. If the public is broadly committed to
protecting the environment for future generations and for spiritual
reasons, as surveys suggest,62 the concept of sustainability will help
citizens to evaluate whether certain policies and decisions are consistent
or inconsistent with widely shared values.
There are several objections that may be raised to the value of
sustainability. First, introducing the concept of sustainability does not
63
make the answers to these questions easy. How to reconcile the needs
of current and future generations, how to reconcile economic and non-
economic values, and how to deal with the problems of limited
information and understanding will remain thorny problems. But no
ethic will resolve these questions or make them easy. The value of the
concept of sustainability is in framing these issues for the public as
important value questions that our laws and policies must address. The
important question is whether we will face them and if so, how careful
our thinking will be. 64 Sustainability can promote better thinking by
only one among six reasons for caring about protecting the environment. The justifications
selected by the surveyed individuals were: responsibility to future generations to protect
the earth - 39%; nature is God's work - 23%; protect the balance of nature for you and
your family to enjoy health - 17%; respect nature - 10%; appreciation for beauty - 6%;
to protect America's natural history - 4%; don't know - 1%. Id.
6 Id. at 5-6. Seventy-four percent ranked as very important protecting habitats for
their values cleaning the air and water we humans rely on; 72% ranked as very important
protecting forests because they clean our drinking water; 72% ranked as a very important
reason for protecting biodiversity the fact that new medicines are mostly derived from
plants and animals. Id. at 7.
62 See supra note 60.
See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Deciphering "Sustainable Development," 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 977, 978 (1994), who points out that sustainable development embodies the inherent
conflict of interests between developing and developed countries. The developing
countries have natural resources and want development. The developed countries have
economic development and want the developing countries to preserve their resources.
When raised in the United States' domestic policy context, the term sustainability raises
slightly different issues, although Stone's point still holds - sustainability embodies value
conflicts. However, I don't suggest resorting to sustainability as a policy or legal standard
to resolve conflicting values, but only as a concept that highlights and frames the ethical
issues.
Laura Westra highlights the possibility that law may operate as an interim
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making the questions clearer and more concrete.
Many holistic approaches emphasize transforming our sense of our
humanity. Sustainability may be a small step, but it is potentially one
that enables both modest and radical transformation. By confronting the
challenge of enlarging our spatial and temporal horizons directly, we are
forced to step outside the comfort of traditional ethics. By focusing
attention on a model of preservation of capital as an alternative to the
spend-down model of capitalism, sustainability can promote
transformative deliberation. And by incorporating social equity,
sustainability brings environmental values and other human values into
the same picture.
Still, the risk that this or any other concept will be co-opted to serve as
an apology for current practices without encouraging reflection upon
underlying value questions is real.65 A fair criticism is that the term lacks
a common meaning, even after twenty years of currency.6 However, a
concerted effort to use the term to promote engagement with ethical
issues could help to offset these risks.
CONCLUSION
An important challenge for those working at the intersection of
environmental law and philosophy is to identify the values we embrace
today through our laws. Knowing the values we are advancing as a
society through our laws is essential to any serious debate about
reforming our law or our ethics. A clearer sense of the values that
dominate our laws and policies today may foster more serious thought
about the values we want to protect and why.
If environmental philosophy is to take root, it must help people to
move from the dominant ethics of human-centered utilitarianism or it
paternalistic measure until education occurs. WESTRA, supra note 2, at xviii. In a similar
vein, I suggest that exposure to, and adoption of, new concepts can promote further
thought, understanding, and transformation of people's ideas and ethics.
65 See Michael Wenig, Book Review: Making Sense of Growth and Sustainable Development,
28 ENVTL. L. 235, 237-38 (1998).
" Even those who see the value of sustainability, like Bryan Norton, have commented
on the "deep conceptual ambiguities." SEARCHING FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 2, at 225.
Stone points out that this can be an asset in the context of international treaty negotiations.
Stone, supra note 63, at 978. I do not claim a similar virtue to its ambiguity in the debate
about values and advocate continued work by philosophers and lawyers to develop the
term's meaning. Norton's effort to develop an ecological definition of sustainability, as
opposed to a social scientific one, is a good example of how the term can address
shortcomings of economic approaches by considering reversibility and employing a holistic
approach. See NORTON, SEARCHING FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 2, at 171-76.
80 University of California, Davis [Vol. 37:53
must help to transform that ethic from within. Work to develop
concepts short of coherent environmental ethics may be an important
step to promote deeper thought about the ethical challenges
environmental problems present. Sustainability is one concept that can
frame and focus attention on key ethical questions.
